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PUT TO THE PROOF: EVIDENTIARY
CONSIDERATIONS IN WISCONSIN HATE
CRIME PROSECUTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Wisconsin, like numerous other states,' has enacted a hate crime
statute, increasing the penalty for certain offenses if the victim was
selected due to his or her membership in one or more enumerated
categories.2 Many commentators have viewed these statutes with alarm,
arguing that the statutes represent the prosecution of individuals
entirely for prohibited thought or speech.3  The Supreme Court
1. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-13 (2004); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(2)(c)(22) (2004); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-702, 13-1604 (2004); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 422.6, 594.3, 11411 (West
2005); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-106.5 (West 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 6a-58,
53-37a (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1304 (2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.085,
806.13 (West 2004); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-1.2 (LexisNexis 2004); IOWA CODE ANN. §
729A.2 (West 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4003, 21-4111 (2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
346.055, 532.031 (West 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:107.2 (2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17-A, § 1151 (2004); MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27 § 460A, repealed by Acts 2002, ch. 26, § 1, eff.
Oct. 1, 2002; but see S.B. 578 (SN), H.B. 692, 2005 Leg., 419th Sess. (Md. 2005); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 22C, § 32 (2005); MICH COMP. LAWS § 750.147b (2004); MINN. STAT. §§ 609.2231,
609.749 (2005); MiSS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-305 (West 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. 88 45-5-221,
45-5-222 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-111 (2004); NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.1675 (2004); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6 (2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-4, 2C:44-3 (West 2004); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 240.31 (McKinney 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-3 (2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2927.12 (West 2004); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 850 (2004); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 166.155, 166.165
(2002); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2710 (West 2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-38 (2004); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-19B-1 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-309 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-3-203.3 (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1455 (2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57 (West
2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.080 (2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-6-21 (West
2004); WIs. STAT. § 939.645 (2003-2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-9-102 (2004) (criminalizing the
selection of a victim because of bias or increasing the penalty for an existing crime). See also
Karl Menninger II, 57 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 11 (2000).
2. WIS. STAT. § 939.645 (2003-2004). A bill to create a Federal Hate Crime Statute has
been introduced on several occasions, most recently in the Hate Crime Prevention Act of
2005, H.R. 259, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. IH (2005), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/-
cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong-bills&docid=f:h259ih.txt.pdf.
3. See, e.g., Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Can Words
Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39
UCLA L. REV. 333 (1991); James Weinstein, Hate Crime and Punishment: A Comment on
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 73 OR. L. REV. 345 (1994); Thomas D. Brooks, First Amendment-
Penalty Enhancements for Hate Crimes: Content Regulation, Questionable State Interests and
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addressed these concerns in Wisconsin v. Mitchell,4 holding that since
such statutes remain tied to prohibited conduct, they do not chill free
speech and are thus constitutional
Even though hate crime statutes have been ruled constitutional,
prosecutors rarely invoke such statutes despite a federal law requiring
6
states to track hate crimes and a public perception that such laws are
necessary! This is in part because incidents motivated by bias (or "hate
crimes") comprise a tiny percentage of all crimes,8 but also because a
prosecutor seeking a conviction under Wisconsin's hate crime statute
faces a daunting challenge. In order for a violation of Wisconsin's hate
crime statute9 to result in conviction, the prosecutor must be confident
in her ability to convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant had an impermissible motive in selecting the victim. In the
absence of a tell-tale clue, such as a spontaneous outburst by the
defendant or a long history of biased acts, convincing a jury is an
Non-Traditional Sentencing, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 703 (1994); William J. Burnett,
Wisconsin v. Mitchell: First Amendment Fast-Food Style, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV.
385 (1995); Gregory R. Nearpass, Comment, The Overlooked Constitutional Objection and
Practical Concerns to Penalty-Enhancement Provisions of Hate Crime Legislation, 66 ALB. L.
REV. 547 (2003).
4. 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
5. Id. at 488-89. The Court noted:
The sort of chill envisioned here is far more attenuated and unlikely than that
contemplated in traditional "over-breadth" cases. We must conjure up a vision of
a Wisconsin citizen suppressing his unpopular bigoted opinions for fear that if he
later commits an offense covered by the statute, these opinions will be offered at
trial to establish that he selected his victim on account of the victim's protected
status, thus qualifying him for penalty enhancement.
Id.
6. Hate Crime Statistics Act, 28 U.S.C § 534(b)(1) (2000).
7. See, e.g., Brief of Petitioner at 24-27, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (No.
92-515); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 13-15, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S.
476 (1993) (No. 92-515); Brief for Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law as Amicus
Curiae at 18-22, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (No. 92-515); Brief for the
American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 17-19, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S.
476 (1993) (No. 92-515); Brief for the Anti-Defamation League et al. as Amici Curiae at 9-10,
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (No. 92-515); Brief for Congressman Charles E.
Schumer et al. as Amici Curiae at 8-9, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (No. 92-
515). Furthermore, it is hard to imagine that forty-six jurisdictions would enact a law
unsupported by a majority of the electorate.
8. Of thirty-one incidents labeled hate crimes and reported in Wisconsin in 2003, sixteen
were serious, or index, crimes, consisting of eight incidents of simple assault, five aggravated
assaults, and one burglary. There were a total of 168,761 index crimes in 2003, so hate crimes
represented 0.008%. Office of Justice Assistance, Crime and Arrests in Wisconsin 2003, 4,
257, available at http://oja.state.wi.us/docs-view2.asp?docid=3836 (last visited Feb. 15, 2005).
9. WIS. STAT. § 939.645 (2003-2004).
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arduous task. Consequently, a prosecutor must carefully examine the
evidence before deciding to charge a violation of section 939.645.
This Comment addresses the practical questions involved with hate
crime prosecutions; namely, what events convince a prosecutor to
charge the penalty enhancement, what evidence may be introduced, and
what evidence will convince a trier of fact that the requisite intent
existed. Viewed through the lens of recent prosecutions, including that
of four individuals from start to finish for an incident in 2003, we can
gain some insight into how those questions are answered in light of
practical experience.
This discussion is broken into five sections. Section II describes the
historical background of the statute, outlining the reasons for the
electorate's demand for such a statute, the legislature's reaction to that
pressure, and how the statute was affected by Wisconsin's recent
adoption of "truth-in-sentencing." Section III outlines the
constitutional validity of section 939.645 as addressed by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court in the first
prosecution under section 939.645. Section IV discusses the specific
evidentiary issues involved in a hate crime prosecution, including the
types of evidence generally produced, the rules governing their
admissibility, and how specific facts can affect the decision to charge a
violation of section 939.645 and the chances for a conviction. Section V
shows how the considerations raised in Section IV affected the
prosecution of four individuals involved in a 2003 hate crime, and
Section VI, shows what trends can be gleaned from the real-life
application of section 939.645.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE STATUTE
In the mid-1980s, the Wisconsin electorate became concerned that
crimes motivated by the race, sex, religion, or sexual orientation of the
victim, commonly known as hate crimes, were both widespread and
under-penalized.' ° Specific events in Wisconsin supported this belief.
One commentator described three widely discussed incidents where
"because the damage caused by these acts in monetary terms was
modest, the crimes were treated as minor misdemeanors worthy only of
minor punishment."" The legislature reacted to the public's perception
10. Peter K. Rofes, The First Amendment in its Third Century: Three Wisconsin Pieces to
the Constitutional Puzzle, 1998 WiS. L. REV. 861, 862 (1998).
11. Id.
20051
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by creating section 939.645 of the Wisconsin Statutes, commonly
described as the "hate crime" provision. 12  The sponsor, State
Representative David E Clarenbach, stated, "[T]here has been an
alarming increase in crimes that seem to have been motivated by
bigotry."'3 Regardless of whether there had been a great increase or
merely the perception of one,' the legislature saw it as important
enough to pass the bill. Section 939.645, as enacted, increases the
penalty for a crime committed when the actor "intentionally selects the
person against whom the crime.., is committed or selects the property
which is damaged or otherwise affected by the crime.., because of the
race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or
ancestry of that person or the owner or occupant of that property."'5
Section 939.645 is one of seven sentence-enhancing provisions retained
under Wisconsin's "truth-in-sentencing" scheme enacted in 2001.16
The legislature viewed the law as akin to other penalty enhancement
provisions, comparing it to the statutory provision providing for an
increased penalty where the offender attempts to conceal his or her
identity or wears body armor.17 Consequently, the law provides for
increased penalties for any crime in the Wisconsin Criminal Code.' 8
In order for section 939.645 to apply, the actor must have selected
the victim specifically "because of the actor's belief or perception
regarding" a prohibited category of people. 9 This raises a clear practical
question, namely, how does one prove a belief or perception? The
author of the statute, Bruce Fuestel, felt that "the questions involved in
trying to prove a motive of an offender" put the effectiveness of the
12. Act of Apr. 21, 1998, No. 348, 1987 Wis. Sess. Laws 1232 (codified at WIS. STAT. §
939.645 (1987-1988)).
13. Shirley S. Abrahamson et al., Words and Sentences: Penalty Enhancement for Hate
Crimes, 16 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 515, 520 (1994) (quoting State Representative David
E. Clarenbach in THE BADGER HERALD, Oct. 28, 1987).
14. In 2004, law reviews published 194 articles concerning hate crimes.
15. WIS. STAT. § 939.645 (1987-1988). Section 939.645 was amended in 1991 to include
age, creed, physical condition, marital status, sex, political affiliation, and arrest or conviction
record as prohibited categories.
16. Act of July 26,2002, No. 109, 2001 WIS. SESS. LAWS 1327.
17. Drafter's notes, Act of Apr. 21, 1998, No. 348, 1987 Wis. Sess. Laws 1232.
18. Specifically, raising the penalty for all misdemeanors below Class A to a maximum
fine of $10,000 and a one-year term in the county jail, raising any Class A misdemeanor to a
felony, with a maximum fine of $10,000 and a maximum prison term of two years, and
increasing the maximum fine for any felony by $5,000 and five years. WIS. STAT. § 939.645
(2001-2002).
19. WIS. STAT. § 939.645(1)(b)(2001-2002).
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statute in doubt.2° The statute specifically requires a special finding of
fact, stating that "the court shall direct that trier of fact find a special
verdict as to all of the issues specified,' a requirement reinforced by
the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey2
Unlike other mens rea crimes, a hate crime, by its nature, is seen as a
societal concern because the victim is selected not because of a personal
animus, but because of a categorization over which the victim has no
control and consequently has no warning that he or she has been
selected as a target. 3  Hate crimes, then, are seen as particularly
harmful.24  It was with this social policy in mind that the Code
Reclassification Subcommittee of the Criminal Penalties Study
Committee, tasked with reclassifying the "hundreds of felonies" then
existing under Wisconsin law to comport with Wisconsin's truth-in-
sentencing scheme, elected to recommend that section 939.645 remain
as a penalty enhancer rather than be "reclassified as a sentencing
aggravator.''25 Despite the rarity of section 939.645 prosecutions, "the
Subcommittee concluded that, although it is not charged very often, the
policies underlying the provision were significant., 26 Specifically, the
hate crime enhancer was charged in sixty prosecutions in 2000, and
seventy-four in 2001.27 It is worthy to note that the revision of the
structure of the truth-in-sentencing regime provided for "enough
penalty exposure to encompass the commission of crimes under the
aggravating circumstances addressed by most penalty enhancement
statutes."28
20. Drafter's notes, Act of Apr. 21, 1998, No. 348, 1987 Wis. Sess. Laws 1232.
21. WIS. STAT. § 939.645(3) (2001-2002).
22. 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.").
23. See Rofes, supra note 10.
24. See, e.g., The American Psychological Association, Hate Crimes Today: An Age-Old
Foe In Modern Dress (2005), available at http://www.apa.org/pubinfo/hate/. It has been a
fertile field for legal scholarship as well: law reviews have published over 2200 articles on the
subject.
25. E-Mail from Professor Thomas Hammer, Chairman of the Code Reclassification
Subcommittee of the Criminal Penalties Committee to the author (October 27, 2004)
[hereinafter E-mail from Thomas Hammer] (on file with the author).
26. Id.
27. Leah Thorsen, Hate Crimes Leaped Last Year in State, Nation, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Nov. 26, 2002, at 3B, available at http://www.jsonline.com/news/state/nov02/98820.-
asp. But see Office of Justice Assistance, Crime & Arrests in Wisconsin 2003, 237-39,
http://www.oja.state.wi.us/docs-view2.asp?docid-3836.
28. E-mail from Thomas Hammer, supra note 25.
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Section 939.645 was thus retained as a penalty enhancer for policy
reasons despite the rarity of its use and the increase in penalty being
readily encompassed within the felony reclassification scheme of "truth-
in-sentencing." Again, under Wisconsin law and Apprendi, a prosecutor
seeking a conviction under section 939.645 must charge the violation in
the criminal complaint and prove the prohibited motive beyond a
reasonable doubt,2 9 which would not be required had the enhancement
been reclassified as a sentencing aggravator. ° At least partially because
of this high standard and low effect, section 939.645 is generally the
subject of plea negotiations and the charges are often dropped in return
for a guilty plea."
As with other hate crime statutes, section 939.645 was eventually
challenged as unconstitutional because it seemed to prohibit not only an
action, but an abstract belief.32 The next section discusses this challenge
to Wisconsin's hate crime statute.
III. WISCONSIN V. MITCHELL: THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF
SECTION 939.645
In 1989, Todd Mitchell was among a group of black males who
severely battered Gregory Reddick, a fourteen-year-old white male, and
stole his shoes.33 The appellate court, in considering Mitchell's appeal,
noted that "Reddick was severely injured; he was comatose for about
four days; and his injuries might have been fatal had he not received
medical treatment."3 Mitchell was convicted of aggravated battery,
party to a crime, and "[t]he jury separately found that Mitchell
intentionally selected Reddick as the battery victim because of
Reddick's race., 35 The separate finding caused the court to sentence
Mitchell to a term of imprisonment two years greater than that for the
aggravated battery alone.6
29. See WIS. JI CRIMINAL 996 ("Selecting the person against whom a crime is committed
because of Race, Religion, Etc.").
30. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,490 (2000).
31. See State v. Bieri, Dane County Case Number 2003CM002695 (June 29, 2003)
[hereinafter State v. Bieri II] (amended to drop the 939.645 violation October 3, 2003).
32. Burnett, supra note 3, at 390.
33. State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 809 (Wis. 1992)
34. State v. Mitchell, 473 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis.
1992).
35. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 809.
36. Id.
[89:453
PUT TO THE PROOF
Central to Mitchell's conviction were two statements he made prior
to the attack. Specifically, Mitchell said, "Do you all feel hyped up to
move on some white people?" and "You all want to f-k somebody up?
There goes a white boy; go get him.""
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reasoned that the conviction rested
on these statements, finding that the statute impermissibly restricted
speech: "the fact remains that the necessity to use speech to prove ...
intentional selection threatens to chill free speech. Opprobrious though
the speech may be, an individual must be allowed to utter it without fear
of punishment by the state."38 The court also took an expansive view of
"speech," stating that "[b]ecause the circumstantial evidence required to
prove the intentional selection is limited only by the relevancy rules of
the evidence code, the hate crimes statute will chill every kind of
speech."3 9
The United States Supreme Court disagreed.' Because the statute
prohibits the selection of a victim rather than the speech itself, the Court
concluded that hate crime statutes such as section 939.645 punish the
impermissible act of committing a crime with a particular motive.4 A
unanimous Court upheld the statute, ruling that "[t]he First
Amendment, moreover, does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech
to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent. 4 2 The
Court reasoned that in order to qualify a defendant for punishment
under section 939.645, bigoted speech must be connected to an
underlying crime, and accordingly, cannot place the actor in jeopardy
unless that actor commits a crime. 43 The Supreme Court found that
even though the statute reaches a wide variety of speech, the statute
does not chill speech, rejecting "the prospect of a citizen suppressing his
bigoted beliefs for fear that evidence of such beliefs will be introduced
against him at trial if he commits a more serious offense against persons
or property. This is simply too speculative .... ""
The Supreme Court upheld Mitchell, then, on the grounds that
protected speech may be introduced as evidence of a particular motive. 5
37. Id. at 815-16.
38. Id. at 816.
39. Id.
40. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 483 (1993).
41. Id. at 486.
42. Id. at 489.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 489; see also Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 642 (1947).
2005]
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As a practical matter, simple advocacy of an unpopular or odious
opinion generally is not enough to convict an actor. In fact, the
legislature considered limiting the evidence upon which the trier of fact
may base the special verdict, originally stating that "[t]he trier of fact
may not base a finding that an intentional selection under sub. (1)(b)
occurred solely upon words spoken by the actor." 46 This limitation was
later revised to read "the actor's thoughts," before being dropped
entirely.
Section 939.645 withstands constitutional scrutiny because actions
normally constituting "free speech" provide proof of motive. The
Supreme Court compared the connection as akin to state statutes
punishing murders for "pecuniary gain" more harshly than other cases
of intentional homicide.48
Accordingly, a prosecution under section 939.645, considered in light
of Wisconsin v. Mitchell, may rest on the introduction of evidence to
prove the actor's motive, which presents a practical problem of
relevance and admissibility. Under Wisconsin Statute 904.04, evidence
of other acts is not admissible to prove acts in conformity with a
character trait, such as a bias against a particular group, but does allow
such acts as proof of motive. 49 The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in finding
that section 939.645 prohibits a crime committed with a particular
motive rather than prohibiting an abstract viewpoint, not only salvaged
the statute, but described the theory under which "other act" evidence is
admissible, as evidence of motive. ° The next section discusses how this
theory of admissibility affects the State's decision to charge a violation
of section 939.645 and what the State will attempt to introduce as
evidence.
IV. EVIDENTIARY CONSIDERATIONS IN HATE CRIME PROSECUTIONS
As a practical matter, a prosecutor alleging a violation of section
939.645 will often develop a variety of sources as evidence of the
46. Draft of S. Amend. to Assemb. 507, 1991-92 Leg. (Wis. 1991).
47. Id.
48. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 486.
49. WIS. STAT. § 904.04 (2003-2004) ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in
conformity therewith. This subsection does not exclude the evidence when offered for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident.").
50. State v. Sullivan, 576 N.W.2d 30, 33 (Wis. 1998).
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defendant's motive in selecting a victim. 1 Possible sources include
"confessions or admissions by the defendant[,] ... contemporaneous
statements made in the course of committing the act, statements to third
parties (if admissible), membership in and association with members of
known 'hate groups.' 52 Other sources of evidence could include the
defendant's clothing or tattoos, possession of literature, or music
reflecting a bias, or the defendant's choice of interior d6cor.53 In order
to prove the forbidden motive, the prosecutor will likely seek more
evidence than a single racist statement or act,54 particularly if a
statement consists of an inaccurate racial slur.5
For example, in 2001, two Asian-American men were assaulted and
beaten by assailants describing them as "niggers."56 Despite the rapid
arrest of the perpetrators and a clear racial motivation, the Dane
County District Attorney's Office stated "the chance of convicting the
two men of a hate crime were slim" because the two offenders used the
word "nigger," a racial slur not often applied to Asians. 7 While the
language of statute 939.645 clearly contemplates this situation, providing
that the penalty enhancement applies "whether or not the actor's belief
or perception was correct, 58 the Dane County District Attorney's office
felt that it could not prove the impermissible motive without evidence of
the correct perception. The failure to prosecute this incident illustrates
a practical concern imposed on 939.645 prosecutions-the difficulty of
distinguishing an attack from an attack with an impermissible motive. A
victim selected randomly is not necessarily the victim of a hate crime
and a person selected because of personal, preexisting animus probably
does not meet the standards of section 939.645.' 9
51. Menninger, supra note 1, § 11.
52. Id.
53. State's Motion In limine, State v. Gerloski, No. 2003CF982 (Waukesha Co.) (Sept.
17, 2004); State v. Lentz, No. 2003CF985 (Waukesha Co.) (Nov. 17, 2004).
54. Menninger, supra note 1, § 19.
55. Samara Kalk, UW Students Cite "Terror;" Minorities Tell Of Harassment and Fear,
MADISON CAPITAL TIMES, Nov. 2001, at 1A, available at http://www.madison.com/archives/r-
ead.php?ref=tct:2001:1 1:07:48962:FRONT.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. WIS. STAT. § 939.645(1)(b) (2003-2004).
59. WIS. STAT. § 939.645(3). The statue requires that the victim be selected "in whole or
in part" because of a person's race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national
origin, or ancestry. If the victim is selected randomly, then these categories play no part in the
selection. If the victim is selected because of a preexisting animus, the prosecutor would have
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's animus was motivated by the
victim's race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin, or ancestry, an
20051
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In fact, a history of hostility or a personal relationship may be
enough to convince a jury or a prosecutor that a crime does not qualify
as a hate crime under section 939.645. In 2001, a defendant was found
guilty of disorderly conduct as a result of an incident where he drove his
truck onto a neighbor's property, then pounded on the front door and
screamed "profanities such as 'you (expletive) lesbians will go to hell."'
The jury, however, did not find that he targeted the victims due to their
sexual orientation.' The defendant, Dary Byczek, had had prior
dealings with the victims, and the defense successfully argued that "if a
heterosexual couple, a normal husband and wife, would have lived in
the house, Dary's behavior would have been the same. 61
Similarly, the murder of Juana Vega, a well-known lesbian, by her
ex-lover's brother, was determined not to be a hate crime, even after
extensive investigation at the behest of community activists.62 Simply
put, the Milwaukee County District Attorney did not find enough
evidence that Ms. Vega had been killed because she was a lesbian rather
than because of events between her and her ex-partner. 63
Of course, the most convincing evidence of an impermissible motive
is the defendant's own statement. In fact, a hate crime prosecution in
Wisconsin is extremely rare without the actor making a biased remark
immediately prior to or during the incident. In the most notorious "hate
crime" on record in Wisconsin, James Langenbach claimed that he
committed two murders because voices in his head instructed him to
begin a "Race War.""6 Few defendants are so forthcoming as to their
motive. Attacks motivated by bias do not originate in a vacuum. The
actors are generally aware of the strong social odium placed on attacks
motivated because of a bias towards race, religion, and other protected
categories. 65 However, an actor in the heat of the moment may indulge
assertion easily defeated by, for example, introducing incidents where the defendant showed
no animus towards individuals belonging to the same category.
60. Vikki Ortiz, Hate Crime Allegation Rejected: Yelling at Women Found to be
Disorderly Conduct, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 13, 2001, at 3B, available at
http://www.jsonline.com/news/state/jan01/hatel3011201.asp. See also Jason Shepard, Lesbian
Hate Crime Case To Go To Trial, CAPITOL TIMES, December 7, 2000, at 2A, available at
http://www.madison.com/archives/read.php?ref=tct:2000:12:07:174531:Local/State.
61. Ortiz, supra note 60.
62. Georgia Pabst, Hate Crime Not Likely, Activists Say, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb.
10, 2002, at 2B, available at http://www.jsonline.com/news/metro/feb02/19230.asp.
63. Id.
64. State v. Langenbach, No. 1999CF000494 (Kenosha Co.) (May 17,1999).
65. See, e.g., id. The court explained:
Mr. Langenbach, the first thing I need to talk to you about is the acts that you
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in speech that falls within the ambit of the statute.66
Furthermore, the State must walk a fine line in its theory of
admissibility. Under section 904.04 of the Wisconsin Statutes, which
prohibits character evidence "for purposes of showing that the accused
had a corresponding character trait and acted in conformity with that
trait,, 67 evidence of racism may not be admissible.6 According to the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, section 904.04 prohibits "a chain of
inferences running from act to character to conduct in conformity with
the character., 69 The prohibited chain in a prosecution under section
939.645 would run, for example, "the defendant owns racist material,
therefore the defendant is a racist, therefore he committed this crime
because of the victim's race." The State needs to demonstrate that the
"other act" evidence is probative not just of a belief, but probative that a
particular act was committed because of "the race, religion, color,
disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry" of the victim.
70
If the State introduces evidence of racism, for example, it is not enough
to demonstrate that the defendant holds racist beliefs, but the State
must also show that these beliefs found expression in the selection of a
victim. 7' Indeed, demonstrating an undifferentiated racism or prejudice
may be detrimental to the State's theory of admissibility.72  The
defendant may hold all sorts of prejudices, but section 939.645 requires a
finding that this particular victim was selected for an impermissible
reason.
Other possible sources of evidence would be prior activity by the
defendant, possession of particular literature, or tattoos.73  Under the
committed. There are no words that are adequate to describe the repugnance and
revulsion that a civilized person should feel over what you did in running down
these two young boys because of the color of their skin. You are deserving of the
contempt and scorn of a civilized society. It was a despicable act. It was a horrific
act. It was a terrifying act, and it ought to terrify all of us that you were capable of
doing that and it ought to terrify you that you were capable of doing that.
Id. See also State v. Langenbach, 2004 Wis. App. 205, J 4, 688 N.W.2d 783 (unpublished
opinion) (holding that despite the severity of the language, such remarks, considered in light
of the totality of the record, did not constitute abuse of discretion).
66. State v. Sullivan, 576 N.W.2d 30, 36 (Wis. 1998). See also 7 DANIEL D. BLINKA,
WISCONSIN PRACTICE: EVIDENCE § 404.5, at 135 (2d ed. 2001).
67. Sullivan, 576 N.W.2d at 36. See also Menninger, supra note 1, § 11.
68. Sullivan, 576 N.W.2d at 36; WIS. STAT.§ 939.645 (2003-2004).
69. Sullivan, 576 N.W.2d at 36.
70. WIS. STAT. § 939.645.
71. Menninger, supra note 1, § 19.
72. 7 DANIEL D. BLINKA, WISCONSIN PRACTICE: EVIDENCE § 404.6, at 141.
73. See Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 165 (1992) ("We therefore conclude that the
Constitution does not erect a per se barrier to the admission of evidence concerning one's
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law established in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, items normally protected by the
First Amendment, such as tattoos, clothing, or personal possessions,
may be used as evidence of particular elements of a crime;" therefore,
items used to prove the impermissible motive for the crime are properly
evaluated as "other act" evidence.
"Other act" evidence in Wisconsin is governed by State v. Sullivan,
75
which provides a three-part analysis.
First, the evidence must be offered as one of the permissible uses of
character evidence, such as "proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident,"76 which, in the case of a hate crime, will usually be motive, or
absence of motive other than the defendant's bias. 7
Second, the evidence must be relevant, that is, probative of a
consequential issue in the case." The evidence must relate to at least
one fact or inference that can determine the outcome of the trial, and it
must make that fact or inference more or less probable.79  The
proponent, that is, the party seeking to have the item admitted into
evidence, "must articulate the fact or proposition that the evidence is
offered to prove. '
Finally, even if the "other act" evidence is offered for a permissible
reason and makes a consequential issue or inference more likely, the
trial judge must follow section 904.03 of the Wisconsin Statutes and
weigh the probative value of the evidence against "the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
beliefs and associations at sentencing simply because those beliefs and associations are
protected by the First Amendment."); see also State v. Jeske, 541 N.W.2d 225, 228 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1995) ("It is well established that verbal statements may be admissible as other-acts
evidence even when not acted upon.").
74. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993) ("The First Amendment,
moreover, does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime
or to prove motive or intent. Evidence of a defendant's previous declarations or statements is
commonly admitted in criminal trials subject to evidentiary rules dealing with relevancy,
reliability, and the like."); see also Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631 (1947).
75. State v. Sullivan, 576 N.W.2d 30 (Wis. 1998).
76. WIS. STAT. § 904.04(2) (2003-2004).
77. State v. Fraher, No. 2004CM001326 (Dane Co.) (Apr. 23, 2004) (Defendant made
harassing telephone calls as the result of the victim's appearance in a newspaper story.). See
also Ed Trelevan, Harassing Calls To Gay Couple Prompt Hate Crime Charges; Madison Man
Is Accused of Unlawful Telephone Use, WIS. ST. J., Apr. 24, 2004, at B5, available at
http://www.madison.com/archives/read.php?ref=wsj:2004:04:24:370103:LOCAL/WISCONSI-
N.
78. State v. Davis, 645 N.W.2d 913,921 (Wis. 2002).
79. Sullivan, 576 N.W.2d at 38-39.
80. Id. at 38.
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considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.,
81
In a Wisconsin hate crime prosecution, then, the prosecution must
tread carefully. It has 'the challenging task of proving a defendant's
racist or other evil intent and specific ill will towards the victim, based
on their protected status," 82 without running afoul of section 904.03's
prohibition against unfair prejudice and cumulative evidence. Mere
membership in a racist or otherwise biased organization is not enough to
convict a defendant, since the statute punishes deeds, not words, and
abstract beliefs are protected by the First Amendment.83
The vast majority of hate crime prosecutions never reach a jury, so it
is difficult to state with a great deal of certainty what a jury finds
convincing. The Wisconsin jury instructions for section 939.645 require
a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was selected "in
whole or in part" because of bias,8 but in the real world, prosecutors
apply section 939.645 to cases in which "in part" means "in large part."
The following section discusses how this consideration affected the
prosecutions of four individuals accused of committing a hate crime.
V. THE CRUZ CASE: EVIDENTIARY CONSIDERATIONS POSED BY
SECTION 939.645 IN ACTION
In August 2003, three men, Mark A. Davis, Mark W. Lentz, and
Jeffrey Gerloski, urged on by Davis' girlfriend, Kasey Bieri, assaulted
Armando Cruz outside a bar in Waukesha, Wisconsin.85
The prosecution argued that Bieri, who pled no contest to a racially
motivated crime two days before the incident, lured Cruz outside the
bar because "he was looking at her and it pissed her off."' When Cruz
81. WIS. STAT. § 904.03 (2003-2004), see also Sullivan, 576 N.W.2d at 38.
82. Nearpass, supra note 3, at 570.
83. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 167 (1992)
84. Wis. JI CRIMINAL 996; David Doege, Beating Case Evidence Challenged,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 24, 2004, at 1B, available at http://www.jsonline.com/news/w-
auk/may04/231709.asp.
85. Brian Hueber, Woman in Hate Crime Case Tied to Earlier Racial Incident,
WAUKESHA FREEMAN, Oct. 10, 2003, http://www.gmtoday.com/news/localstories/2003/Oct-
ober_03/10102003_.03.asp.
86. Criminal Complaint at 6, State v. Gerloski, No. 2003CF000982 (Waukesha Co.),
State v. Davis, No. 2003CF000983 (Waukesha Co.), State v. Bieri, No. 2003CF000984
(Waukesha Co.), State v. Lentz, No. 2003CF000985 (Waukesha Co.) (Oct. 7, 2003)
[hereinafter Criminal Complaint].
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exited the bar, Bieri "called him a fucking wet back," 87 and Davis then
struck Cruz with a bottle, with the three men kicking him once he fell to
the pavement. 88 Despite the close proximity and rapid intervention of
police officers, Cruz was beaten so severely that his injuries required
seventeen stitches.89 Because the four selected their victim because of
his race, all four individuals were subject to section 939.645. 90 All four
eventually pled guilty to crimes ranging from disorderly conduct to
substantial battery,9' but each plea agreement included an Alford9 plea
to section 939.645.
After the attack on Armando Cruz and the arrest of all four actors,93
the district attorney obtained search warrants for the homes of the
defendants, seizing, among other items, "an English copy of 'The Last
Will and Testament of Adolf Hitler,' Aryan race record albums,
Confederate flags, 'skinhead/white power' compact discs, pamphlets
with anti-Jewish propaganda and a bumper sticker declaring 'White
Men Unite and Fight."'94 Since the defendants had not confessed, the
district attorney sought to use the seized items as "other act" evidence
to demonstrate the intent required by section 939.645. 95 The State also
motioned for the admission of the t-shirt worn by one of the defendants
96
as well as various tattoos.The initial impetus for charging the hate crime enhancer came at the
87. Id. at 4.
88. David Doege, 4 Charged Under Hate Crime Law in Waukesha, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Oct. 8, 2003 at 5B, available at http://www.jsonline.com/news/wauk/oct03/175543.-
asp.
89. Id.
90. State v. Gerloski, No. 2003CF000982 (Waukesha Co.) (Oct. 7, 2003); State v. Davis,
No. 2003CF000983 (Waukesha Co.) (Oct. 7, 2003); State v. Bieri, No. 2003CF000984
(Waukesha Co.) (Oct. 7, 2003); State v. Lentz, No. 2003CF000985 (Waukesha Co.) (Oct. 7,
2003) (Access to the Wisconsin Circuit Court public records is available at
http://wcca.wicourts.gov (follow "I Agree" hyperlink; then enter case name and case number
and follow "Search" hyperlink).).
91. State v. Gerloski, No. 2003CF000982 (Waukesha Co.); State v. Davis, No.
2003CF000983 (Waukesha Co.); State v. Bieri, No. 2003CF000984 (Waukesha Co.); State v.
Lentz, No. 2003CF000985 (Waukesha Co.).
92. "[A]n Alford plea is simply a guilty plea, with evidence in the record of guilt,
typically accompanied by the defendant's protestation of innocence and his or her
unequivocal desire to enter the plea." United States v. Mackins, 218 F.3d 263, 268 (3rd Cir.
2000) (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25,38 (1970)).
93. Davis and Bieri were apprehended at the scene. Gerloski and Lentz were allowed to
leave the scene but were arrested later. Criminal Complaint, supra note 86, at 5.
94. Doege, supra note 84.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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prosecutor's review of the arrest. The arresting officer recognized the
clothes and appearance of the suspects as indicative of people holding
white supremacist beliefs.' One of the suspects, Lentz, was wearing
"Aryan Wear" boots, which featured a tread made from the gothic SS
used by the Schutzstaffel and swastikas.' Bieri used a racial slur,
"wetback," in addressing Cruz immediately prior to the assault, and she
had a prior record of a racially motivated assault.' However, none of
the four defendants made a statement to the police that indicated that
they selected Cruz because of his race.'0° In the absence of such a
statement, the officers' observations and the statements they collected
from witnesses and the victim provided the first indication that a hate
crime had occurred."' There was little doubt of guilt; Davis was caught
literally red-handed, as his arms and hands were covered with Cruz'
blood.'0 2 Moreover, the police actually witnessed the battery.
The prosecutor decided, in reviewing the arrest report, that the
incident constituted a "hate crime," fitting neatly into the classification
developed when the legislature enacted the statute. Despite the usual
concern about proving the motive beyond a reasonable doubt, "the hate
crime enhancer was never on the table,"'0 3 and all four defendants
ultimately pleaded guilty to charges that included the enhancement.'
1°
As the prosecution developed, it was clear that the chief issues were
the evidentiary considerations involved in proving a violation of section
939.645; the two less culpable defendants, Gerloski and Lentz,' were
successful in severing their cases, and, in a move unusual for a low level
felony prosecution, the State filed a motion in limine to clarify the
97. Interview with Susan Opper, Waukesha County Assistant District Attorney, in
Waukesha, Wis. (Nov. 5, 2004).
98. Photograph from Case File, State v. Lentz, No. 2003CF000485 (Waukesha Co.).
99. Case File, State v. Lentz, No. 2003CF000485 (Waukesha Co.).
100. Interview with Susan Opper, supra note 97.
101. Id.
102. Photograph from Case File, State v. Lentz, No. 2003CF000485 (Waukesha Co.).
103. Interview with Susan Opper, supra note 97.
104. State v. Gerloski, No. 2003CF000982 (Waukesha Co.); State v. Davis,
2003CF000983 (Waukesha Co.); State v. Bieri, No. 2003CF000984 (Waukesha Co.); State v.
Lentz, No. 2003CF000985 (Waukesha Co.).
105. From the facts established by the initial investigation, it became apparent that
Gerloski and Lentz did not strike the initial blow, nor did they confront Cruz directly. At the
preliminary hearing, Cruz was unable to identify Lentz or Gerloski as striking him.
Preliminary Hearing, State v. Lentz, No. 2003CF000485 (Waukesha Co.); E-Mail from M.
Elizabeth Weathers, Attorney for Mark Lentz, Waukesha County Public Defender's Office,
to the author (Nov. 15, 2004) (on file with author).
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admissibility of the evidence obtained from the search warrants.' °6
The statute does not prohibit the selection of a particular victim.
Rather, it prohibits the selection of a victim because of an intent to harm
individuals of a class or because that individual belonged to a class. In
terms of the attack on Cruz, Bieri stated that she did not like the way
Cruz was "looking at her."'"° For purposes of section 939.645, it is vital
that Bieri found it offensive that a man of a particular race was looking
at her and the four defendants then attacked Cruz because of it. Absent
a finding that it was his race that was the deciding factor, the defendants
would not have violated section 939.645.
It was the absence of prior dealings that convinced the assistant
district attorney that Cruz had been the victim of a hate crime."a
Witness statements to the effect that the four actors had stated, "I want
to kill somebody tonight" prior to the attack on Cruz, coupled with their
use of racist language in that context, reinforced this conclusion."
Both Lentz and Gerloski gave statements to police in which they
denied that Cruz was attacked because he was Hispanic."1 Lentz
admitted that he, Bieri, and Davis believed that "blacks and Hispanics
belong with their own kind," stating that they were friends because they
shared this belief."'
The State was thus relying on extrinsic evidence to prove the motive
in selecting Cruz as a victim. The State accumulated a variety of
evidence from several sources: the tattoos on bodies of the actors, the
actors' possessions, their clothing, and the contents of their vehicles.'
The State also sought to try the four defendants together, enabling them
to combine the evidence gathered from Lentz's clothing, the items in his
car, and the items in Davis' and Bieri's apartment."3
The defendants moved for severance, believing that the evidence
was cumulatively damning, but considered separately, raised a
reasonable doubt regarding whether Cruz had been selected because of
his race."'
Once severed, each defendant filed motions opposing the State's
106. Interview with Susan Opper, supra note 97.
107. Criminal Complaint, supra note 86, at 6.
108. Interview with Susan Opper, supra note 97.
109. Criminal Complaint, supra note 86, at 5.
110. Id. at 6, 7.
111. Id. at 6.
112. Interview with Susan Opper, supra note 97.
113. Criminal Complaint, supra note 87, at 1-2.
114. E-mail from M. Elizabeth Weathers, supra note 105.
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motion in limine."5 Drawing heavily on State v. Sullivan, the defendants
argued the following: (1) that items seized from Bieri's and Davis'
shared apartment could not be attributed to a particular defendant;' 6 (2)
that items of personal property, such as Lentz's clothing and the CD and
DVD collection, and the literature obtained from Davis' and Bieri's
shared residence, were not properly considered to be acts;"7 and (3) that
even if the evidence met the first and second prongs of the Sullivan test,
it failed the third prong, being so prejudicial that it should be excluded
under section 904.03 of the Wisconsin Statutes. "' Furthermore, Davis
and Bieri argued that none of the literature or other items of
propaganda seized at their apartment showed an anti-Hispanic
animus."9
These arguments were partially successful. Certain items of
evidence, for example, a Confederate flag2' and a Nazi flag, were
excluded as being either irrelevant or non-probative.
121
The defendants were also successful in introducing items of evidence
that would seem to contradict the State's claim of racial animus.
Gerloski introduced numerous photographs showing him with friends
115. Defendant's Initial Brief as to Other Acts Evidence, State v. Gerloski, No.
2003CF000982 (Waukesha Co.) [hereinafter Defendant's Initial Brief]; Defendant's Response
to State's Motion to Allow Introduction of "Other Acts" Evidence in State's Case in Chief,
State v. Davis, No. 2003CF000983 (Waukesha Co.) [hereinafter Defendant's Response];
Bieri's Motion in Opposition to the State's Motion to Introduce Other Acts Evidence, State
v. Bieri, No. 2003CF000984 (Waukesha Co.) [hereinafter Bieri's Motion]; E-mail from M.
Elizabeth Weathers, supra note 105.
116. Defendant's Response, supra note 115, at 4-5; Bieri's Motion, supra note 115, at 4-5.
117. Defendant's Initial Brief, supra note 115, at 6-7; Defendant's Response, supra note
115, at 5-6; Bieri's Motion, supra note 115, at 5; E-Mail from M. Elizabeth Weathers, supra
note 105.
118. Defendant's Initial Brief, supra note 115, at 7-8; Defendant's Response, supra note
115, at 7-8; Bieri's Motion, supra note 115, at 5-6; E-mail from M. Elizabeth Weathers, supra
note 105.
119. Defendant's Response, supra note 115, at 6; Bieri's Motion, supra note 115, at 5.
120. It is worthy of note that what is commonly described as "the Confederate Flag,"
and the item of evidence seized in this case is not, properly speaking, "the" Confederate Flag.
That flag, that of a blue St. Andrew's cross on a red, rectangular field, was not the
Confederate National Flag, but was the battle flag of the Army of Tennessee and adopted by
the Ku Klux Klan by its founder, Nathan Bedford Forrest, who had served with that army.
The equivalent would be a U.S. Army Divisional Flag.
121. E-Mail from M. Elizabeth Weathers, supra note 105; Interview with Susan Opper,
supra note 97. Mere possession of racially charged material, of course, is not evidence of
racism. An examination of the author's library, for example, would reveal several diaries of
prominent Nazis and a great number of works describing the rise and fall of the Third Reich
and the Holocaust, including several by David Irving, a historian who denies the existence of
the Holocaust.
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and relatives of various colors and ethnicity.122 A Hispanic cousin even
wrote a letter to the court on Gerloski's behalf. 23 Lentz introduced a
variety of photographs showing his entire DVD collection as well as his
collection of books, thus undercutting the impact of the State's
photographs implying that Lentz had focused his choice of
entertainment on racial issues.2 After the court's ruling on the motion
in limine and the severance of the prosecutions, it appeared that the
evidence of bias was strongest against Bieri. She had committed a
previous assault that appeared to be motivated by her racist beliefs,
1 25
and she objected to the way Cruz was looking at her.1 26  Lentz's
statement to police also indicated that Bieri pointed out Cruz.'27 He also
stated that Davis told Bieri to lead Cruz outside the bar and that Davis
had taken the lead in battering the victim.
1 28
Once the cases were severed and the evidence against each
defendant was considered separately, what appeared to be a concerted
race-based attack by a group splintered into what could plausibly be
described as a drunken assault because of an insult to Bieri.1 29 As a
deliberate tactical maneuver, Lentz and Gerloski successfully distanced
themselves from the two more culpable defendants, and the only
evidence connecting a defendant's bias with the attack was Bieri's
"fucking wetback" remark.
Since Bieri selected Cruz and Davis struck him, Lentz and Gerloski
could share in liability under section 939.645 if the battery was the result
of concerted action, or under a theory of imputed knowledge, that they
knew Bieri and Davis had selected Cruz because of his race and
intended to harm him.13 Lentz did state that he, Davis, and Bieri all
122. Defendant's photographs, Case File, State v. Gerloski, No. 2003CF000982
(Waukesha Co.).
123. See Case File, State v. Gerloski, No. 2003CF000982 (Waukesha Co.).
124. Court File, State v. Lentz, No. 2003CF000985 (Waukesha Co.); E-mail from M.
Elizabeth Weathers, supra note 105.
125. See State v. Bieri II, No. 2003CM002695 (Dane Co.). Lentz had been present on
that occasion as well but had interceded to calm the situation. When the police arrived, the
victim of that battery described Lentz as being of great assistance. E-mail from M. Elizabeth
Weathers, supra note 105.
126. Criminal Complaint, supra note 86, at 6.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Interview with Attorney Mark Rosen, Rosen and Holzman, Defense Counsel for
Mark Allen Davis, Waukesha, Wis. (Nov. 16, 2004).
130. It is unclear whether party liability for a hate crime can be based on imputed
knowledge-it is extremely unlikely, given that the statute is written with a strong mens rea
component.
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"think alike."'3 Lentz was present at the earlier incident, and all four
initially left the bar together and stood together in the alley until Bieri
returned to the bar and re-exited, followed by Cruz.32
Fundamentally, the State's case for a section 939.645 violation rested
on the linking of four factors: (1) the defendant's prior statements
predicting violence that evening;'33 (2) the items seized from the
defendants showing racial bias;' (3) Bieri's racist remark; and (4) the
lack of any other contact between the victim and the defendants.
Taken together, these items form a pattern. Considered separately, it is
clear why one defense attorney "smelled reasonable doubt all over this
case."1
36
Why, then, did the defendants plead guilty to a range of charges
from substantial battery (a class I felony) to disorderly conduct (a class
B misdemeanor)? Quite simply, it was because they were guilty of the
underlying offense-battering Cruz. Mark Rosen, Davis' defense
attorney, described his client's options as gambling a harsher sentence
for the underlying offense against a finding that no hate crime
occurred.137 As implied by the Alford pleas, the defendants preferred
the deals offered by the State to their chances at trial. Nonetheless, the
defense and the prosecution reached different conclusions regarding the
likelihood of a jury reaching the conclusion that the defendants
committed a hate crime in battering Cruz. In the following section, I
compare these conclusions with those reached in other hate crime
prosecutions.
VI. CONCLUSION
In a section 939.645 prosecution, as noted above, there are three
likely sources of evidence to prove the impermissible motive: first, and
most important, statements by the defendant; second, prior acts by the
defendant; and third, the defendant's possessions. Where the defendant
has not been forthcoming enough to provide a clear declaration of an
impermissible motive, the State is forced to address the twin horns of a
dilemma. The greater the defendant's likely motive for committing a
131. Criminal Complaint, supra note 86, at 6.
132. Id. at 6-7.
133. Id. at 5.
134. Bieri's Motion, supra note 115, at 1.
135. Interview with Susan Opper, supra note 97.
136. E-mail from M. Elizabeth Weathers, supra note 105.
137. Interview with Mark Rosen, supra note 129.
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hate crime, the closer the State comes to presenting pure character
evidence, prohibited by section 904.04 of the Wisconsin Statutes.
Moreover, an incident between individuals with a past history makes it
more likely that the crime was committed for the purpose of harming a
particular victim rather than because of the actor's belief regarding the
victim.,
In many cases, the impermissible motive might well be obvious. It is
difficult to conceive of an act of vandalism using racist, religiously
prejudiced, or sexually prejudiced terms that would not be targeted due
to a belief about the victim's race, religion, or sexual orientation. But,
while such incidents were a major factor in the adoption of section
939.645,139 they are not the chief source of such prosecutions. Most
section 939.645 prosecutions, at least those which receive press
attention, are those concerning violence or the threat of violence,
against a particular victim."'40
A prosecution under section 939.645 generally has one chief,
overriding characteristic: a public statement directly showing bias by at
least one defendant.'' This may be a statement made in police
custody, 142 a statement made immediately prior to the crime to other
actors 43 or to the victim," or inherent in the nature of the crime
charged, as in the case of an abusive telephone call. Incidents where
the victim is subjected to abuse, even abuse of a clearly biased nature,
may not be charged as a hate crime unless the "correct" slur is used.46
For example, without the racial slur used by Bieri, it is unlikely that the
attack on Cruz would have been prosecuted as a hate crime' 47 Absent
such a statement, prosecutors generally will not charge the hate crime
138. See Pabst, supra note 62.
139. See Rofes, supra note 10, at 862.
140. Oritz, supra note 60 (quoting Howard Eisenberg, former dean of the Marquette
University Law School).
141. Criminal Complaint, supra note 86, at 4-5; Interview with Susan Opper, supra note
97.
142. "Prosecutors charged Anschutz with a hate crime because an eyewitness testified
he saw the first encounter between the two on Bagnall Road and heard Anschutz yelling a
racial slur." Andy Neleson, Egg Harbor Man Gets 7 Years for Hate Crime, GREEN BAY
PRESS-GAZETrE, Aug. 9, 2003, at lB. See State v. Langenbach, 688 N.W.2d 783, 2004 WL
2100013 (Wis. Ct. App.).
143. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 480 (1993).
144. Criminal Complaint, supra note 87, at 4.
145. State v. Fraher, No. 2004CM001326 (Dane Co.) (Apr. 23, 2004).
146. Kalk, supra note 55.
147. Interview with Susan Opper, supra note 98.
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enhancement.'48
Once alerted by the actor's statement, prosecutors will seek to
introduce evidence supporting the actor's motive, or absence of other
motives, but such evidence is far less important than the biased words
themselves, as it is subject to attack on grounds of relevance, undue
prejudice, and impermissible character evidence. 9
Even if the biased statement is made, the jury may not be convinced.
While the jury instruction for section 939.645 emphasizes that the
selection of victim must be made "in whole or in part" because of the
religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry
of the victim,15° it appears that a jury is disinclined to grant the State a
great deal of leeway concerning "in part."
For example, in State v. Byzcek,'5' though the jury found Byczek
guilty of the underlying crime, the jury did not believe that Byczek had
berated his neighbors "in part" because of their sexual orientation.
Also, since the prosecutor in the Cruz case found the absence of other
motives for the attack on Cruz compelling and the defense attorneys felt
compelled to develop alternate theories of motive, one can conclude
that the absence of other motives, more than the strength of the
evidence supporting the impermissible motive, is likely the deciding
factor. In effect, the jury generally requires exactly what the drafters
contemplated-compelling proof of the actor's motive. As the drafters
of section 939.645 envisioned,'52 this is a difficult hill to climb.
It seems, then, that the statue does in fact regulate speech, as the
Wisconsin Supreme Court believed.153 However, a second characteristic
of hate crime prosecutions is that there is often no doubt as to the
identity of the actor."' The vast majority of hate crime prosecutions
involve a defendant arrested almost immediately after the incident. The
148. Compare State v. Parrilla, No. 2001CF006028 (Milwaukee Co.) (Nov. 14, 2001) and
Pabst, supra note 62 (not charged as a hate crime) with State v. Grosskopf, No. 2001CF000103
(Jefferson Co.) (Apr. 4, 2001) and Richard W. Jaeger, Waterloo Murder Labeled Hate Crime,
WIS. ST. J., Feb. 6, 2002, at B1, available at http://www.madison.com/archives/read.php?ref=w-
sj:2002:02:06:38508:LOCAL/WISCONSIN. (defendant charged with a hate crime because of
statements that he had stabbed a gay man, in which he employed an objectionable term for
gay men).
149. See 7 DANIEL D. BLINKA, WISCONSIN PRACTICE: EVIDENCE § 404.5, at 136.
150. WIS. JI CRIMINAL 996.
151. No. 2000CM000176 (Green Co.) (June 6, 2000).
152. Drafter's notes, Act of Apr. 21, 1998, No. 348, 1987 Wis. Sess. Laws 1232.
153. State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 816 (Wis. 1992).
154. See, e.g., State v. Byczek, No. 2000CM000176 (Green Co.); State v. Grosskopf, No.
2001CF000103 (Jefferson Co.); State v. Langenbach, No. 1999CF000494 (Kenosha Co.);
Criminal Complaint, supra note 86, at 4.
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close connection between the biased remark and the criminal act
generally required for the prosecution to charge a violation of section
939.645, furthermore, underlines the point raised by the Supreme Court
that the speech must be attached to a criminal act in order to be
evidence of criminal intent.'
This practical requirement for a close relation between biased
speech and a criminal act makes sense in light of the fact that most hate
crimes are committed on the spur of the moment, where hostility flashes
into action. 56 Most people are inclined to speak first and act second,
and hate crimes are no exception. Jurors may well be swayed by very
human motives in that they want to believe people do not act
randomly.'57 Defendants charged with a hate crime invariably seek to
break the connection between their speech and the incident. 8
It may seem that these real-life considerations are obvious and
axiomatic. Yet, hate crime prosecutions, with their heightened mens rea
component, raise the challenge of trying to peer inside the actor's
motivation and experience. A mind is not easily divided, and it may
well be that the actor does not know exactly why he or she selected the
victim. Hate crime prosecutions are thus rife with reasonable doubt,
and a prosecutor must first overcome his or her own doubts. Because
the hurdle set by section 939.645 is so high, the prosecutor generally
requires a clear, unequivocal indication of bias that an actor's own
statement provides. The jury's predilection for finding reasonable doubt
may also be due to a desire to believe that we are not a society where
biased individuals roam the landscape.
In light of the practical application of section 939.645, it appears that
the furor over the hate crime penalty enhancer is misplaced. The statute
does what it was designed to do: punish instances where the victim is not
merely a member of a protected class but is actively made the target of
hostility because of his or her membership.
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